Vancouver Riot: Fail to Plan, or Plan to Fail?
The rioting that followed the Vancouver Canucks’ Stanley Cup final series loss stunned many, but was entirely predictable and avoidable.
In what could only have seemed to be a good idea to the worst security and civic planners, an estimated 100,000 people were permitted to congregate on city streets and watch the hockey game live on large screen televisions.
The largely uncontrolled fan zones offered contract security pat-downs for contraband, which were proven to be completely ineffective when at the moment the game ended, beer bottles and other missiles were hurled at the giant flat screens in a show of unmatched ingratitude.
Police clearly missed an opportunity to make a last minute transition into riot gear well before the end of the game. Several people later told media they left after the second period with their small children because they believed the crowd’s mood had changed and they thought violence might ensue.
Following a similar riot in 1994, a police-contracted researcher made over 100 recommendations to prevent a repeat occurrence of hockey fan violence. That same expert watched the recent riots erupt live on television, and saw nearly every one of his recommendations ignored or forgotten, from the presence street furniture and parked cars, several of which were later burned, to a lack of coordinated public transit and unprepared police.
Police were especially criticized for their “meet and greet” approach to crowd control. Vancouver’s chief, Jim Chu, stated officers had to withdraw from streets to don riot gear when the mood turned ugly, causing a delay in responding to events. Shockingly, the chief’s strategy ignored the fact that law enforcement is almost universally reviled in the Lower Mainland of B.C., where Canada has its only publicly funded safe drug injection site, marijuana grow operations are at the highest per capita rate, and a violent gang war has raged over the lucrative hard drug market for six years.
Instead, the chief and civic planners should have torn a page from the UK where public disorder and its police response, particularly surrounding large sporting events, is an art form.
Almost any premier football match in England involves upwards of 100,000 fans all brought to and from the event in a carefully planned manner, under the intense and watchful eyes of police. While many of those officers may be wearing a standard uniform and a smile, around nearly every corner in crowded fan areas are riot-ready officers and teams of public order cops in vans ready to respond to trouble immediately.
Known trouble makers are proactively sought out long before match time, and either apprehended or reminded via personal visits from police that their presence is both unwelcome and noticed.
Finally, there is a distinct absence of anything like a public “fan zone” or outdoor large screen television that might encourage large crowds of people to gather. This daft idea is not even contemplated, as it is a public order nightmare.
Instead, those lucky enough to have tickets to a match are kept moving through designated routes to and from the stadiums. Those attending without tickets are expected to watch the game down at the local, effectively distributing the crowds into smaller, confined groups that are easier for police resources to manage.
Another riot, another opportunity to learn, for Vancouver, which had seen through the Olympics without much of a fuss and was lulled into a false sense of security. Should the Canucks find themselves flirting with another NHL championship final, hopefully the public order plan will be one of keeping order, and not planned failure as was the case in June of 2011.

